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ABSTRACT. Innovative moments (IMs) are exceptions toward the problematic self-narrative 
that brought the client to therapy, which emerge in the therapeutic conversation. Dialogically, 
an IM might be conceived as an expression of an alternative I-position which challenges the 
dominance of problematic voices, thus having the potential to transform the self-narrative as 
they are expanded and elaborated. Reconceptualization is a particular type of IM which usually 
emerges in the middle of the process of a successful treatment, increasing steadily until the end. 
Moreover, reconceptualization seems to be a distinctive feature of a successful psychotherapy 
process, as it is almost absent in poor outcome cases. This IM has two main features: the 
presence of a contrast between a previous self-narrative and a new emergent one, and the access 
to the process which allowed for the transformation from the former to the last. This innovative 
moment clearly involves a special I-position which Hermans has characterized as a meta-
position. We discuss four functions of this type of IM in the change process: (1) providing a 
narrative structure for change; (2) bridging the past and present self-narratives; (3) facilitating 
the progressive identification with the new self-narrative; and (4) allowing surpassing the 
ambivalence often involved in the change process. 
 
 
For the past years we have been developing a research program which addresses 
how novelties emerge and evolve in the therapeutic process. This program, inspired in 
the narrative tradition in psychology (Bruner, 1986; McAdams, 1993; Polkinghorne, 
1988; Sarbin, 1986), conceives people as narrators, providing meaning to their lives 
through the construction of stories. From a dialogical perspective (Hermans & Kempen, 
1993; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004; Hermans & Konopka, 2010) these narratives are 
built through dialogical processes, given that, for each narrative told, there was a voice 
that was telling a story to an audience. Of course, the narrator and the audience are often 
internal, as we frequently tell stories to ourselves. From a narrative-dialogical 
perspective, the construction of knowledge involves the creation of stories, told by 
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motivated narrators (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995), whether these stories are 
functional or dysfunctional, adaptive or pathological. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to characterize dysfunctional self-narratives 
or the dialogical processes involved in their creation or maintenance. We recommend 
the special section of the Journal of Constructivist Psychology for a comprehensive 
discussion of this subject (Dimmagio, 2006; see also Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press). 
For the topic we are developing here, it suffices to say that dysfunctional self-narratives 
which bring clients to therapy are, as clinicians know very well, resistant to change. As 
Frank and Frank (1991) stated, one could expect that as dysfunctional patterns, or 
assumptions (to use his term), are the target of intrapersonal (e.g., bringing suffering) 
and interpersonal invalidation (e.g., creating relational problems), they should be easy 
to change. However, as Frank and Frank emphasized, the opposite occurs, given all the 
processes that create strong bias in the construction of knowledge, protecting the 
dysfunctional assumptions from revision. Virtually all clinical models have created 
theories that explain how these processes develop, from cognitive errors and 
attributional bias in cognitive therapy, to defensive processes in psychodynamic theory. 
From a dialogical standpoint, these processes of self-narrative dysfunctional stability 
could be described as a tension between different I-positions that struggle to be heard, 
in which a dominant voice, or coalition of voices, keeps itself in the foreground and 
manages to push others to the periphery (Hermans & Konopka, 2010). When new 
voices emerge, a novelty appears and a new story can develop from there. These 
novelties do not need to be powerful transformations, and are often very subtle in the 
beginning of the change process, as the following hypothetical example evidences: 
“My life is a misery, I feel depressed all the time, without the strength to do 
anything. I do not have any pleasure in living. For me life is a burden. 
Curiously, yesterday I had some pleasure playing with my son and it felt good.” 
In this very simple sentence one can infer the presence of two different voices. 
One dominant (life is a misery) and another more peripheral one (I had pleasure playing 
with my son). From our point of view, the second voice, implicit in the client’s 
discourse, represents what we call an innovative moment (IM), that is, a challenge to the 
dominant self-narrative. Therapists from the narrative tradition (e.g., White & Epston, 
1990; White, 2007) call these occurrences unique outcomes, in the sense that they 
represent an exception toward a dominant problematic self-narrative. In the solution-
focused tradition (de Shazer, 1991; Miller, Hubble, & Duncan, 1996) experiences like 
this are simply called exceptions and are viewed as windows of opportunity in the 
change process. Strategic therapists also claim the importance of small changes which 
could catalyze more important changes through a domino effect (Watzlawick, 
Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). In line with these ideas, Valsiner (2008), from a 
developmental perspective, claims that it is the direction of meaning construction—





development. Thus, our approach tracks the small changes that occur in psychotherapy, 
which, by accumulation and also by a gestalt effect (i.e., through the interaction 
between different innovative moments; Gonçalves, Matos, & Santos, 2009), can lead to 
more significant changes, transforming the self-narrative. 
As change starts to develop, innovative moments necessarily occur, as new 
voices come to the foreground and the formerly dominant ones are pushed to the 
background or transformed in the dialogical relationship with the new voices. 
According to the narrative tradition (White & Epston, 1990), change can be started by 
the therapeutic elaboration of innovative moments, by developing a therapeutic 
curiosity toward what could be different narrative accounts (see White, 2007, for the 
clinical guidelines of this process), different possibilities of living. However, even when 
other therapeutic tools are used to prompt the revision of the former problematic self-
narrative (e.g., empty-chair work), novelties necessarily emerge as the former 
problematic pattern is revised. Hence, from our view, regardless of looking at 
innovative moments as processes of change or products of change, there is no change 
without the emergence of innovative moments. 
Our research program has been tracking innovative moments (IMs) along 
treatment in different models of therapy and with several samples (Matos et al., 2009; 
Mendes et al., in press). Research allowed us to systematically identify 5 types of IMs 
in the clients’ discourse: action, reflection, protest, reconceptualization, and performing 
change IMs: 
1. Action IMs are specific behaviours which are different from what the 
problem impels the person to do. 
2. Reflection IMs refer to new ways of thinking, feeling and new 
understandings about the implications of the problem in the client’s life that 
allow him or her to defy the demands of the problematic self-narrative. 
3. Protest IMs entail new behaviours (like action IMs) and/or new thoughts 
(like reflection IMs) against the problem, representing a refusal of its 
assumptions and prescriptions. This active refusal is the key feature which 
allows distinguishing protest from action and reflection. 
4. Reconceptualization IMs are a more complex and multifaceted type of IM 
which enables the clients’ comprehension about what is different about him 
or herself and the process which fostered this transformation. These IMs 
require the clients’ description of two components: 1) the contrast between 
the self in the past (problematic self-narrative) and the self in the present and 
2) the depiction of the process which allowed for this change.  




5. Performing Change IMs represent the performance of change, new ways of 
acting and being that emerge from the change process. They also represent a 
process of transforming in-therapy outcomes into extra-therapy changes. 
In other publications (Gonçalves, Matos, & Santos, 2009) we have described 
how these IMs develop in successful psychotherapy, contrasting it with what was found 
in poor outcome cases. For the purpose of this article, it is enough to say that action, 
reflection and protest emerge in both good and poor outcome cases. However, good 
outcome cases are also characterized by the emergence of reconceptualization IMs in 
the middle phase of the treatment, which often become the most dominant IMs as 
therapy progresses. This does not happen in unsuccessful psychotherapy. Thus, one 
interesting question is why are reconceptualization IMs so important in the process of 
change? What kind of dialogical processes are present in these IMs? In this article we 
reflect upon the importance of reconceptualization in the therapeutic change, trying to 
grasp what are the main functions of this type of innovation.  
Reconceptualization and meta-position 
As we stated before, reconceptualization has two main components: 1) a 
description of a formerly dominant way of functioning (previous problematic self-
narrative) contrasting it with a new way of functioning, which represents an alternative 
self-narrative; 2) and the processes through which the change from the former to the last 
occurred. It is important to emphasize that the new self-narrative, emergent in 
reconceptualization IMs, is not a complete or finished story, as it is a provisional, 
faltering  first draft of what a new self-narrative could be. As we shall see below, one of 
the functions of reconceptualization IMS is the lively rehearsal of potential new forms 
of being. 
Let us look at the following example of a reconceptualization IM, from the Lisa 
case (Gonçalves et al., 2010), a well known client treated with emotion-focused therapy. 
Lisa had a problem being assertive with others, particularly with her husband. 
Lisa: Yeah, yeah get back into my feelings, yeah and that's, I guess, because the 
awareness I know is there now [Process of change], and before I never knew it 
existed (laugh). So I'm an individual, I realize I'm an individual, and I have the 
right to vent my feelings and what I think is right or good for me and that's been 
the improvement of the therapy.  
Therapist: Yeah, really finding your feet. 
Lisa: Mm hm, as an individual yeah, which before I-I thought I was glued to him [the 
husband] [Contrast between the self in the past and the self in the present] . Yeah, I 





In this example Lisa states that now she is attentive to her feeling (“the 
awareness I know is there now”), that is, she described the process which allowed for 
change to take place. Through this process, the former dominant self-narrative (“before 
I never knew it existed”) turned into a new emergent one (“I’m an individual, and I 
have the right to vent my feelings”). The therapist reflects upon this change (“really 
finding your feet”) and Lisa expands the new emergent self-narrative, again by contrast 
with a former pattern (“I thought I was glued to him” / I found my feet “as an 
individual”). 
In this example we have the client reflecting, or more precisely meta-reflecting, 
over a change process. It is very interesting that, in successful psychotherapy, change is 
constructed by expanding these types of IMs. We should notice that all IMs are 
exceptions toward a problematic self-narrative. However, without reconceptualization 
the other IMs seem insufficient for sustained therapeutic change to unfold, as suggested 
by our data.  
From a dialogical perspective, reconceptualization contains implicitly three I-
positions: the position of the past self, the position of the present (new) self and an 
observing position which has access to the change process (more on this below). The 
concept of reconceptualization is very similar to the concept of meta-position, as 
proposed by Hermans (2003). Recently, Hermans and Konopka (2010) suggested that 
meta-positions are important because of their three main functions: unifying, executive, 
and liberating. The meta-position puts diverse I-positions in contact, connecting 
different voices (unifying function); it has the power to make decisions, for instance 
privileging one position over others in a given situation (executive function); and finally 
it facilitates the ability to stop habitual or automatic patterns, associated with common 
positions, and give priority to new ones, less automatic (liberating function). As we 
stated elsewhere (Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press) “These functions are very clear in 
reconceptualization: past and present have a temporal integration which gives meaning 
to the transition (unifying function), present position is preferred and gets priority 
(executive function), and former habitual patterns, present in the dominant 
(problematic) self-narratives are disrupted and stopped (liberating function).” (p. XX). 
To this proposal we added (see Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press) a fourth function, which, 
from our view, turns reconceptualization into a special type of meta-position: a 
developmental function. A meta-position can connect different positions that are present 
at the same time, or can connect positions that are present in different time frames. Of 
course, as the positions are connected they are in a sense present at the same time. But 
the point here is that reconceptualization facilitates the connection between well 
developed positions (previous problematic self-narrative) and emergent ones 
(alternative self-narrative), prompting change. This type of IM produces an articulation 
of past and present selves, privileging the new in detriment of the old, allowing at the 
same time the old self-narrative to be integrated into the new pattern. Along these lines, 




an interesting question is how reconceptualization facilitates this developmental 
function. 
Developmental function of reconceptualization 
In this section we reflect upon the features of reconceptualization that prompt 
development and change. We suggest that reconceptualization has four intertwined 
main functions: (1) providing narrative structure to the change process, (2) facilitating 
self-continuity, (3) advancing the progressive identification with the new self-narrative, 
and (4) facilitating the resolution of ambivalence over the change process. 
Narrative structure 
Contrarily to the other IMs, reconceptualization has a well developed structure 
and is closer to a narrative product, by the emphasis on a time frame: the past self-
narrative versus the present self-narrative. Contrast the following reflection IM with a 
reconceptualization IM of Jan, a client who “felt that she had to be perfect in every 
respect in order to be lovable” (Goldman & Greenberg, 1997, p. 423) 
Session 1 
C: I guess I put myself into that role of superwoman and maybe I'm not happy in that 
role any longer [Reflection IM] 
Session  13 
C: I guess I don't feel like I have the whole weight of the world on my shoulders, like 
I'm responsible for everybody  [Contrast between the self in the past and the self in 
the present] (…) looking at some of the things that happened and some of the hurts 
that I had maybe I never dealt with some of the things that happened to me; by sort 
of talking about them, bringing them out here, I was able to deal with them and put 
them where they belong in [Process of change], not being so timid, you know, part 
of me like was very outgoing and an extrovert and aggressive and then the other 
very timid person that was afraid to speak up ... it's almost like really a split 
personality (…) but the timid one never really came out. I sort of kept it hidden all 
the time. 
T: that was this sort of vulnerable little girl inside that was scared and… 
C: …that always has to do good things to be accepted, to be liked  
T: …yeah the good little girl that has to be good or nobody would really, like me or 
accept me... you've been doing that for a long time  
C: but 
T: as I remember last week, you said you didn't want to do it anymore  





This is not an uncommon example. Reconceptualization often occupies more 
time of the session than other IMs, which are more episodic in nature. Probably these 
IMs scaffold the narrative elaboration of a new identity, better than any other type of 
innovation, contributing to an integrative account of the client’s life. Often clients come 
to therapy with a fragmentary account of themselves, having difficulties integrating in 
their self-narratives the diversity of events and experiences they have lived, as it is 
nicely described by the assimilation model of psychotherapy (Honos-Webb & Stiles, 
1998; Stiles, 1999, 2002; Stiles'et'al.,'1990). To create an integrative account of one-
self, which facilitates adaptive experiences, is a very important aim of psychotherapy.  
Narrative structure, as Baerger and McAdams (1999) have empirically 
demonstrated, is highly correlated with psychological adjustment. Moreover, not only 
does the narrative structure present in the reconceptualization allow for the construction 
of an integrated account of the self, but it also facilitates the construction of an 
integrated account of the change process (“...sort of talking about them, bringing them 
out here, I was able to deal with them and put them where they belong in...”). Congruent 
with the narrative model, meaning - in this case, meaning about the transformation in 
one’s life - is organized into a narrative frame.  
Another related feature is the presence inside of reconceptualizations IMs of 
other types of IMs (mainly action and reflection, but also protest performing change 
IMs). Accordingly, we have suggested (Gonçalves, Matos, & Santos, 2009) that 
reconceptualization IMs have a gravitational effect over other innovations, thus 
producing cascades of innovative experiences. In this sense, the first function of 
reconceptualization is to create a narrative structure in the process of change, which 
allows for articulating diverse IMs, giving meaning to the previously emerged IMs (e.g., 
action, reflection). After the emergence of reconceptualization IMs, new action, 
reflection and protest IMs surface, expanding the former reconceptualization IMs, 
creating this way a sort of virtuous cycle. That is to say, as the client views him or 
herself different than before (reconceptualization IMs) the subsequent emergence of 
action, reflection and protest IMs provides for a further proof that significant changes 
are in fact taking place, which in turn reinforces the transformation process. 
Self-continuity through the contrast 
The contrast present in the reconceptualization allows for the rupture (Zittoun, 
2007) between a past self and a new self to be solved, creating a sense of self-
continuity. The self is the same, although different, and the person knows that a 
transition has occurred and why it has occurred. Take the following example of Jan’s 
Case (previously described) who revealed “an unmet need for approval from her 
mother. Jan still longed to be the 'good little girl' who always did right by her 
parents...." (Goldman & Greenberg, 1997, p. 423): 
 




Session 13  
C: I think I'm learning how to deal with my mother one-on-one adult level not as her 
little daughter (…) which I think has helped me an awful lot. I went by my parents’ 
house last week to ask my mother and she was telling me she doesn't feel well, so I 
said okay mom, I said, what would you like me to do, whereas before I'd tried to, 
you know, how- how- what I used to try to do, like, try to talk to her, try to console 
her, try to make her feel better, or you know or whatever [Contrast between the self 
in past with the self in the present], like right now I just left it up to her, like she 
doesn't feel well, okay, what do you want me to do, like you- you say it  
T: kind of what do you want from me? 
C: yes, you know, what can I do about it, like I'm not a doctor, I'm not a magician, 
what can I do?  
T: mm-hm, and that's different from  
C: as before, I tried to sort of solve her problems (…) like I'm her keeper and ah I'm 
responsible for how she feels. Well, I'm not, I can't be! 
T: mm-hm, that's- that's quite a move, eh, for you? 
C: yeah (laughs) it is, and I didn't feel guilty about it afterwards, like I didn't feel like, 
you know, oh, you shouldn't be talking to your mother that way, you know, that's 
something, you've hurt her feelings, or whatever, um, so now it's going to make 
things worse and she's going to take it out, you know, she's going to be annoyed 
and she's going to make, you know, take it out on my dad, because I think a lot of 
that was my motivation, is like, trying to do anything she wanted  of me  to keep 
her happy so she didn't take out her anger on my father 
T: so was- that was your job 
C: that was my role in the family 
C: that's right, but now I realized that no matter what I do she's still going to be the 
way she is with my father and he's going to have to deal with her - it's not my job to 
protect him (…) I realize like, I can't do it, it's not my job and I think I'm not I'm not 
capable of doing it [[Process of change - Jan legitimates her need of giving up on 
her role in the family] 
In this example reconceptualization allowed to bridge the past problematic self 
(“I tried to sort of solve her problems”) with the present emerging self (“I'm not a doctor, 
I'm not a magician, what can I do?”). In the absence of reconceptualization there would 
be a kind of an identity jump, in which a position which formerly dominated the self 
would be substituted by another one. Clinicians know well that, when a jump like this 





happened that facilitated the transition. Curiously, this often prompts the emergence of a 
reconceptualization IM because, through the interaction with the therapist, the process 
that facilitates the “jump” between the problematic self-narrative and the emergent one 
is discovered. This is also associated with the unifying function of meta-positions as 
described by Hermans and Konopka (2010). That is, the meta-position present in 
reconceptualization creates a connection between the past and the present self that is 
meaningful for the client (“I realized that no matter what I do she's still going to be the 
way she is with my father and he's going to have to deal with her”). 
Thus, reconceptualization can be conceived as a meaning bridge (Brinegar et al., 
2006; Osatuke et al., 2004) between the past and the new emergent self, advancing the 
development of new ways of being, feeling, and thinking. A meaning bridge is a sign 
which has a similar meaning for two or more positions, which facilitates the 
assimilation between different positions of the self. In the case of reconceptualization, 
the meaning bridge connects the familiar past with the unknown future, making the 
future predictable, as it has now some contours defining it. Thus, reconceptualization 
allows escaping self -fragmentation and facilitates the development of the new, 
emergent self.  
Progressive identification with the newer self-narrative  
One interesting finding is the repetition throughout the treatment of 
reconceptualization IMs, turning them into one of the most elaborated forms of 
innovation after the middle of the therapeutic process. Why does reconceptualization 
keep repeating itself? It is our proposal that the meta-position involved in 
reconceptualization does not involve a mere self-observation of the client’s internal 
processes, but necessarily entails a performance of agency and compromise. By 
narrating reconceptualizations the person is always demonstrating to him or herself that 
he or she is changing and what its possible direction is. Moreover, the client is narrating 
this to an external other: the therapist. The therapist is an involved partner who 
facilitates the exploration and elaboration of novelties. Thus, the repetition of 
reconceptualization IMs, having the therapist as interlocutor, is certainly an important 
form of consolidating the therapeutic change.  
Thus, we are suggesting, as Wortham (2001), that the self involves two 
interrelated processes: the content being narrated and the act of narration. Wortham 
suggests that an alignment between these two components (the content and the narration 
act) could be a very powerful way to create a particular view of the self: 
“While telling their stories, auto-biographical narrations often enact a 
characteristic type of self, and to such performance they become that type of self” (p. 
XII). 




Notice that if the only things that mattered were the content of the self-narrative, 
only one reconceptualization would be enough for change to occur, and in this case it 
would be a kind of retrospective account of the change process. The occurrence of 
repetitions and the way reconceptualizations are co-constructed between client and 
therapist in the therapy process leads us to believe that these narrative products are more 
than retrospective accounts, as they play an active role in the change process. They are 
not an epiphenomenon of change, they are active elements shaping its construction. 
The process of repetition allows the person to experiment the change before it 
becomes familiar. It is a way of calibrating the movement the self is involved in, as one 
position of the self shows the rest of the self how is the person’s present functioning, 
what is accepted and what is rejected, as illustrated in the following example of Jan’s 
case: 
Session 12  
C: I'm feeling sort of sad saying goodbye to the daughter that they thought they had 
'cause I don't want to be like that anymore I don't want to be the good daughter 
anymore, I want to be me and I want to go on from here in a new relationship 
[Contrast between the self in the past and the self in the present - an innovative 
position of the self shows the rest of the self how is the person’s present 
functioning, what is accepted and what is rejected]it's been a very difficult life 
trying to living up to, ah, what everybody else thought of me and I guess it's made 
me very sad that I can't - I wasn't myself [Process of change – Jan realizes that 
acting as perfect daughter was impeding her of being herself] 
T: What's that it feels like, to say that's what you weren't yourself? 
C: It's like a burden being lifted off my head  
T: felt sad to think or feel you really weren't yourself, you weren't allowed to be - you 
C: no, I was  acting out as this perfect daughter that they think that they have and I'm 
not a very good actress and I think I was believing  that's who I was. 
Cunha, Gonçalves, and Valsiner (in press) explored how the repetition of 
reconceptualization operates as a form of consolidating a progressive identification with 
a new self-narrative, simultaneously facilitating the disengagement with the old one. 
They described a case-study in which, even after the emergence of reconceptualization 
IMs, a back and forth movement between the old and the new self-narrative kept on 
going, suggesting the need that the person has to slowly accommodate the changing 
process.  
We also developed a study which explored how IMs emerge in solving life 
difficulties with a sample of adults without psychopathology (Meira, Gonçalves, 





studies, we split the sample in two groups: one equivalent to the good outcome cases 
and another one equivalent to the poor outcome group. These groups were constructed 
from self-reports of the subjective change from the point of view of the participants. 
One interesting finding from this study was that reconceptualization emerged mainly in 
the group with successful changes, but only in the final session. The group without 
significant change has virtually none reconceptualization IMs. What seems interesting 
here is that, contrarily to psychotherapy, in which reconceptualization IMs emerge from 
the middle of the treatment on, in this particular sample reconceptualization 
discriminates successful from unsuccessful change cases, but these IMs only emerge in 
the last session.  It is important to note that these reconceptualization IMs emerge after a 
clear invitation of the interviewer, when she asked the participants to reflect on the 
change process.  However, people from the unsuccessful group were not able to elicit 
reconceptualization IMs, not even when prompted by the interviewer. 
One way to interpret these differences, between therapeutic samples and daily 
life change, is that the therapist is a much more involved partner than a research 
interviewer, or even a significant other that witnesses the change process, inviting more 
actively the elaboration of reconceptualizations. Only when clearly invited by the 
interviewer, as in the last session of the project, participants who meaningfully changed 
elicited reconceptualization IMs. It is very likely that if those IMs were prompted before 
by the interviewer they would have emerged, as it happens in psychotherapy. 
This function is similar to what Hermans and Konopka (2010) refer to as the 
executive function of the meta-positions. We have also described this function 
(Gonçalves, Matos, & Santos, 2009), from a narrative perspective, as an authoring 
position, from which the change process is elaborated and expanded. The meta-position 
over the change process allows for the person to create his or her own development and 
change. Change is not something that happens to the person, the client is an active agent 
creating it, assigning its meaning,  and shaping the contours of the present and the 
future self-narrative. 
Resolution of ambivalence over the change process 
Change is not linear, as people have several different and even contradictory 
voices in their selves. As Arkovitz and Engle (2007) emphasize, clients are often 
ambivalent towards the change process, which is frequently interpreted by the clinicians 
as resistance to change.  
Our research program explores ambivalence from a dialogical perspective, using 
the concept of mutual in-feeding as proposed by Valsiner (2002, see also Gonçalves, 
Matos, & Santos, 2009). Mutual in-feeding is a dialogical process in which two 
opposing voices keep asserting its position by rejecting the other, as in: 




Voice A: Life is good 
Voice B: Life is bad (Valsiner, 2002, p. 257). 
This process, although dynamic, contributes to the stability of the self, as each voice 
dominates the self intermittently. As Gonçalves and Ribeiro (in press) have stated: 
“This alternation between two opposite positions is more monological (at least 
as an outcome) than dialogical. This relates to a proposal from Hermans and Konopka 
(2010) about the nature of “good dialogue”. Also, from their point of view the presence 
of two or more positions (internal and/or external) does not guarantee that dialogue will 
occur. One of the features of good dialogue is the production of some form of 
innovation, in which each participant takes the other into consideration and is open to 
change their own perspective in response to the other. This is exactly what is absent 
when mutual in-feeding is not resolved.” (p. XX). 
We have been studying the process of mutual in-feeding in therapy through the 
identification, in the sessions, of return to problem markers. These are discursive 
indicators of a return to the problem (that is, the problematic self-narrative), after the 
emergence of an IM, like in: 
“I really wish to go out and cope with my depression, but I just can’t”. 
In this sentence a reflection IM emerges (“I really wish to go out and cope with 
my depression”), but, as it emerges, its potential for change is aborted by an emphasis 
on the problematic self-narrative. There is now empirical evidence showing that these 
occurrences are more common in poor than in good outcome cases (Gonçalves et al., in 
press). 
The process of mutual in-feeding, as it is empirically observed through markers 
of return to the problem, is, in a sense, the opposite of reconceptualization. In both 
processes we have two positions, but in the mutual in-feeding there is an alternation 
between both. In reconceptualization not only is one of the positions advanced and the 
other relegated to the past, but the client is clearly involved in the process of advancing 
the emergent self-narrative. The process of mutual in-feeding is devoid of any executive 
control (Hermans & Konopka, 2010) and the person is a powerless actor of the 
alternation of voices, while in the reconceptualization the person is an active author of 
it, as we emphasized before. 
Curiously, we have also been studying how mutual in-feeding is solved in 
therapy (see Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press) and all resolutions seem to involve 
reconceptualization IMs. Until now we have identified two processes that allow for 
mutual in-feeding’s resolution (Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press). In the first one, the non-
dominant voice, present in the IM, takes over the formerly dominant voice, present in 
the problematic self-narrative, and becomes a dominant position in the self. Let us look 





also Cunha, Gonçalves, Valsiner, Mendes, & Ribeiro, in press), a client who was 
excessively reliant on the approval of others, dismissing her own desires and needs in 
benefit of others’. In the beginning of therapy, whenever she followed her own feelings 
and intuitions, that is, as IMs (non-dominant voice) emerge, she frequently found 
herself consumed afterwards with doubts and guilt, and also afraid of not being 
appreciated by other people (dominant voice), returning to the problematic self-
narrative. Mutual in-feeding decreased along therapy as the non-dominant voice became 
stronger, taking over the formerly dominant one, as it occurs in the following example.  
Session 10 
C: I’m making sure, like for myself, that what I do like if it suits me that's okay and 
that I don't have to live up to anybody's expectations (…) like to I don't know do 
whatever about it if I decide to go for a change or that I need a change or whatever, 
and just like none of that trying to please people I'm sick of it [Contrast between 
the self in the past and the self in the present].T: so, yeah, like I don't have to be 
something that I'm not, just to please other people and I guess that's where I feel 
the sense of who I am is okay (…) it's okay to not please other people. There's also 
the sense of it's enough to be me. 
C: It's definitely, yeah, being less dependent on other people, even so I guess it's kind 
of always nice when you get some kind of acknowledgement or acceptance but I 
also make really consciously an effort like to try, like looking at myself and what I 
do and get like satisfaction out of that and say yeah like I did this well and yes I 
know I can do this and nobody else has to tell me that I'm an alright person 
[Process of change - the non-dominant voice takes over the formerly dominant 
one]. 
In the second form of resolution the two opposed positions present in mutual in-
feeding are transformed into the dialogue between both. This is curiously akin to what 
Hermans and Konopka (2010) call good dialogue. The positions are not just reacting to 
each other, asserting its primacy when the other emerges; they are now involved into a 
negotiating process, listening to each other and transforming themselves in this 
dialogue, as it occurred in Jan’s case. In the beginning of therapy, whenever she 
expressed feelings of dependency and weakness (non-dominant voice), i.e., experienced 
IMs, she frequently restated the need of being strong and independent (dominant voice), 
returning to the problematic self-narrative. Mutual in-feeding decreased along therapy, 
as the non-dominant and formerly dominant voices engaged in dialogue and joint 
action. Let us look at the following example, from Jan’s case:  
Session 7 
C:  It was almost like I could sort of step back and look at myself [during a two-chair 
dialogue] as two different people [referring to the non-dominant voice and the 




dominant one] and I think these two people are in conflict all the time (…) the 
strong part of me - if anybody offers help, no, no, it's okay, I can handle things on 
my own, I can do things on my own, and then there's the other part of me that - 
feels that always has to give in whether it's because … to be liked or … you know, 
not to make confrontation or whatever … must have a split personality [Contrast 
between the self in the past and the self in the present]  
T: so they're always kind of going in opposite directions?  
C: a nice medium ground would be acceptable [Process of change - opportunity of 
dialogue between the non-dominant voice and the dominant one] ( …) well, there's 
got to be a happy medium where you can be strong at times and you also be, you 
know, weak and be, you know (…) looked after and be feminine or the stereotype 
of what feminine is supposed to be like 
T: so you can be a big girl and a little girl at the same time? 
C: by me giving in and being a little girl does not mean that I'm giving up something 
…why can't it be the two of them working hand-in-hand [Process of change - non-
dominant voice and the dominant one engaged in joint action] 
We have argued (Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press) that the second resolution 
seems more elegant, and perhaps more dialogical than the first, but we also speculated 
that in more disturbing clinical situations the first resolution may be important, at least 
at the beginning of the change process. 
In sum, not only is mutual in-feeding typical of poor outcome cases and 
reconceptualization typical of good outcome cases, and from a dialogical perspective 
they seem to be the opposite of each other, but mutual in-feeding is also solved through 
the elaboration of reconceptualization IMs. 
Concluding remarks 
In this article we have elaborated upon four interrelated functions of 
reconceptualization that make it a fundamental innovation in the process of change. 
Reconceptualization allows for the elaboration of the changing process, providing for an 
integrated account of change; facilitates the articulation between the past and the 
emergent self, allowing for a rupture to be solved; the new self is advanced and 
experienced through the repetition of the reconceptualizations; and finally, it allows 
(probably because of the three preceding functions) to solve situations of ambivalence 
toward change.  
We have developed, so far, several empirical studies on the last function (e.g., 
Gonçalves et al., in press), but further research is needed for grounding these theoretical 





our data clearly shows that ambivalence is always resolved through the emergence of 
reconceptualization, regardless of the path through which resolution occurs. 
Another interesting question to be studied is the role reconceptualization plays 
in daily life changes. If the suggestions offered here are correct, how 
reconceptualization emerges in life transitions outside psychotherapy becomes a central 
question. We have seen that people who changed their lives are able to produce 
reconceptualization when invited by the interviewer (Meira et al., 2009), but we have no 
idea how they are produced and performed in their daily lives. In psychotherapy they 
are produced and co-constructed with the therapists, so one can speculate that in daily 
life the audiences which are involved in the construction of reconceptualization must be 
significant others that somehow are involved witnesses of the change process.  We 
strongly believe that, as reconceptualization are performances of the self, in which the 
new self is advanced and a bridge between the old and the new self is built, significant 
others play a pivotal role in this performance, without which no significant change is 
possible. From our view this is an important consequence of conceiving the self 
dialogically: without others (internal and external) no change would be possible, and, of 
course, without change, no self would be viable.  
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